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Abstract 
Extant organizational research into crises has focused on the efforts of  different actors to de-
fend and legitimate their ideologies towards particular actions. Although insightful, such research 
has offered little knowledge about the moral reasoning underlying such action. In this paper, we 
explore how moral reasoning from different ideological viewpoints can lead to polarised debates 
and stalemate within the context of  ecological crises. We apply our conceptual framework in an 
analysis of  the 19th Century French Phylloxera Epidemic (hereafter the Phylloxera Epidemic). 
Drawing upon this analysis, we argue that, by adapting their moral reasoning, opposing stake-
holder groups could maintain their underlying ideology, while at the same time pragmatically 
changing their actions towards the crisis. We discuss the theoretical implications of  our analysis 
for historical research in organizational studies and research on organizations and the natural 
environment. (135 words) 
Keywords: Ideology; moral reasoning; ecological crises; Phylloxera Epidemic. 
Introduction 
In the late 19th Century, an epidemic caused by an aphid-like insect known as the phylloxera de-
stroyed two-thirds of  all European vineyards, generating profound economic and societal impli-
cations. The Phylloxera Epidemic spanned several decades, with the insect arriving in Europe 
from America in the 1860s. The struggle to save the vine led to a vociferous debate over the 
cause of, and response to, the epidemic, that involved over 30 years of  stalemate and failure be-
fore effective solutions could finally be implemented. 
On one side, the ‘disease as effect’ theory was held by the ‘Theists’, who were mainly com-
prised of  members from the French Academy of  Sciences, the Ministry of  Agriculture, and the 
Catholic Church. The Theists reasoned that if  the phylloxera was a parasite native to the Ameri-
cas, American vines would have succumbed long ago (Pouget, 1990). Instead, the Theists be-
lieved that it was neglectful farmers who employed expedient farming practices that made their 
vines susceptible to adverse weather conditions and parasites such as the phylloxera (Gale, 2003). 
On the other side, the ‘Darwinists’ held to the ‘disease as cause’ theory, whose main pro-
tagonists were: Jules-Émile Planchon and his Montpellier colleagues, Charles Valentine Riley, the 
Missouri State Entomologist, and Charles Darwin, among other notable scientists (Desmond & 
Moore, 1992). The Darwinists drew upon Charles Darwin’s theory of  evolution to inductively 
reason that the host and parasite had co-evolved, resulting in gradual adaptations that afforded 
American vines relative immunity from and resistance to the Phylloxera. 
Examining the debate in more depth, we find that beyond the political efforts of  each 
stakeholder group to define their domination over the other through discourse (Grant & Hardy, 
2003; Thompson, 1985), their ideological conflict created a sharp polarisation and thus a delay in 
deciding how to respond to the crisis. It was through adaptation in their respective processes of  
reasoning that opposing groups could overcome the impasse and mobilise collective action to 
develop and implement viable solutions. 
Similar to the Phylloxera Epidemic, other ecological crises such as HIV, the Ebola and 
Zika viruses began as relatively isolated infections but have since evolved into global pandemics 
(Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 2010). Although the causes of  these crises vary, as do their impact, a 
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common theme is the role of  morality in guiding political choices that ultimately make a differ-
ence between societal collapse and sustainability (Diamond, 2006). 
Organisational studies into crises have focused on the discursive efforts of  different actors 
to defend and legitimate their ideologies (Boin, 't Hart, & Mcconnel, 2009; Erkama & Vaara, 
2010; Mueller, Sillince, Harvey, & Howarth, 2004; Samra-Fredericks, 2004; Wodak, 2015). As yet 
however, there has been relatively little attention given to the role of  morality in these discursive 
efforts. 
 In this paper, we build on research into the relation between cognition and language 
(Johnson, 1994; Lakoff, 2002; Lakoff  & Johnson, 1985; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). We define ideol-
ogy as a system of  frames, with each frame composed of  interrelated conceptual metaphors, that 
actors draw upon to make sense of  a situation. This system of  frames is mediated through a 
process of  moral reasoning that determines which frames are prioritised and how their con-
stituent conceptual metaphors are applied to specific situations (Johnson, 1994). A conceptual 
metaphor is a way of  conceptualising one domain of  experience in terms of  another (Cornelis-
sen, 2005; Cornelissen, Holt, & Zundel, 2011; Morgan, 1986; Tsoukas, 1991) – for example con-
ceptualising the moral act of  ‘reciprocation’ through the economic concept of  ‘debt’ (e.g. ‘I owe 
someone gratitude’). Thus, actors do not act based on a fixed set of  moral laws, but rather they 
morally reason, through frames and conceptual metaphors, how to act in a given situation. From 
this, we develop a framework, which helps us to understand the relationship between ideology, 
moral reasoning and how different stakeholder groups frame ecological crises.  
The key contribution of  this paper is to extend our current understanding of  how differ-
ent groups frame a crisis based on their ideology, by emphasising the role of  moral reasoning in 
this process. Past research has discussed the concept of  morality, but only as part of  rhetorical 
strategies of  legitimation, whereby actors invoke emotive moral claims to appeal to human con-
cerns (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Vaara & Tienari, 2002), and to express emotion or ‘move an audi-
ence’ (Samra-Fredericks, 2004). Although these studies illuminate how moral claims can move 
communicative action, it has not offered a deeper analysis of  the underlying reasoning upon 
which these claims are arrived at. We argue that identifying and examining this process of  moral 
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reasoning, will enable a deeper understanding of  the ideologies of  opposing groups, as well as 
their political choices of  action during a crisis. 
Furthermore, we contribute to research on organizations and the natural environment 
(ONE) (Jermier & Forbes, 2011b; Kallio & Nordberg, 2006) by providing rich insights into his-
torical studies of  ecological crises. The ONE literature has repeatedly highlighted the anthro-
pocentric and denatured discourse of  organizational studies, arguing for a more ecocentric dis-
course with which to understand the relationship between organizations and the natural envi-
ronment (Hoffman, 1999; Jermier & Forbes, 2011a; Shrivastava, 1994; Waddock, 2011). This lit-
erature tends towards normative suggestions which typically propose that as ‘stakeholders of  the 
earth… with the capacity to act with intelligence, humans could conceivably do so with the in-
terests of  other living beings, ecosystems, and future generations in mind’ (Waddock, 2011: 15). 
Using stakeholder theory as a perspective, such research views the natural environment as anoth-
er stakeholder on the grounds of  ‘fairness’: managers need to consider their organization’s im-
pact on the environment (see Phillips & Reichart, 2000). We argue for the need to go beyond 
such normative suggestions, and to explore the processes of  moral reasoning upon which the 
natural environment is indeed considered as another stakeholder in the frames of  opposing 
stakeholder groups. As we explore in our analysis of  the Phylloxera Epidemic, it was the persua-
sive frames of  the Darwinists and the persistence of  the phylloxera in resisting eradication ef-
forts that eventually led to the Theists’ acceptance that the vines and the insect had to coexist. 
However, we argue that by better understanding the moral reasoning that informs such frames, 
crises might be resolved in favour of  more sustainable trajectories.   
In the following sections, we begin by reviewing the organizational literature on ideology 
and develop links to framing and moral reasoning. Next we discuss our methods for data gather-
ing and analysis, and explain how we derived the categories in our conceptual framework. We 
then present our findings and analysis of  the Phylloxera Epidemic, and conclude with a discus-
sion of  our analysis and the implications it has for further research. 
Extant Research on Ideology and Framing 
Extant research has defined ideologies as ‘the basic frameworks for organizing the social cogni-
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tions shared by members of  social groups, organizations or institutions’ (van Dijk, 1995: 248). 
They are ‘an action-oriented system of  beliefs’ (Bell, 1962: 400) which functions as the interface 
between the cognitive structures underlying language and action, and the societal position and 
vested interests of  social groups (Fairclough, Mulderrig, & Wodak, 2011; Purvis & Hunt, 1993; 
Wodak, 1989). Cognitive structures and processes include the sociocultural knowledge and be-
liefs, shared by a social group. For example, feminists may share beliefs about abortion, corpo-
rate glass ceilings blocking promotion, and other manifestations of  systemic discrimination. Such 
beliefs are not only internally structured within the social group, but also externally structured in 
relation to the societal position of  the social group against other groups. Similar examples may 
be given for racist vs anti-racist, and corporate vs ecological ideologies. Such ideologies are usual-
ly constructed through long-term processes of  socialisation, by which a group gradually selects 
and retains relevant social norms (van Dijk, 1995, 2006). 
This view is consistent with the perspective on ideologies as the ‘deep structures’ that exist 
in actors’ cognitive maps, which actors instantiate through drawing on them in their daily prac-
tices (Barrett, Heracleous, & Walsham, 2013; Heracleous, 2006; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001). 
These studies highlight that, ‘ideologies are at an elemental level expressed discursively… [and] 
the rhetorical elements that lie at the heart of  ideologies frame how issues are interpreted and 
acted upon’ (Barrett et al., 2013: 204). In other words, the relationship between ideology and dis-
course emerges through the political efforts of  one social group to define their domination over 
others by using different frames (Grant & Hardy, 2003; Thompson, 1985). 
While extant organizational research explores how different actors formulate frames to 
defend and legitimate their ideologies, our understanding of  the process that intertwines the in-
stantiation of  ideologies from framing to action remains incomplete. For instance, previous re-
search has argued that the links between ideology and discourse can be explored in terms of  
identifying enthymemes (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001), rhetorical strategies (Suddaby & Green-
wood, 2005) and discursive legitimation strategies (Erkama & Vaara, 2010), among others – 
thereby explaining the instantiation of  ideology through communicative action.  
While supporting such research, in the next section, we draw upon, and extend, the work 
~   ~5
of  Johnson (1994) and Lakoff  (2002), to argue that social groups use processes of  moral reason-
ing to instantiate their ideologies. 
Ideology and Moral Reasoning 
Morality has been traditionally viewed as a system of  laws or precepts, whose purpose is to dif-
ferentiate actions, intentions and decisions between those deemed as proper versus those that are 
judged as improper (Williams, 2006). This view has origins in Judeo-Christian traditions and has 
emerged from universal principles of  human reason (Donagan, 1979; Kant, 1996). More recent 
studies on cognition and language, however, have begun to change our understanding of  morali-
ty. Rather than comprehending morality as a fixed set of  laws that need be interpreted to judge a 
particular situation, this research points to morality as the outcome of  an embodied and cogni-
tive process of  reasoning (Johnson, 1994).  
Although the cognitive approach agrees with more traditional approaches to morality, in-
sofar as that humans generally possess an innate sense of  right or wrong, they diverge in their 
respective explanations of  how we interpret and respond to situations of  moral ambiguity. Moral 
philosophers (e.g. Donagan, 1979; Gerwirth, 1982; Rawls, 2009) broadly agree that we use pre-
cepts (e.g. ‘thou shalt not steal’) – in other words concepts that are understood as possessing a 
defining set of  essential characteristics (e.g. Was the theft intentional? Did the object belong to 
someone else? Was harm caused?) to evaluate whether specific situations such as shoplifting or 
even insider trading can be categorised as theft. Instead, cognitive research increasingly supports 
the idea that our understanding of  concepts is anchored in prototypes, and that we interpret sit-
uations in relation to those prototypes (Geeraerts, 2006; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978; Taylor, 2003). 
Thus we understand a concept such as ‘theft’ in terms of  a central prototype (e.g. violent mug-
ging, bank robbery, etc.). We evaluate the categorical validity of  non-prototype and therefore 
ambiguous cases (e.g. shoplifting, insider trading, etc.) as a gestalt based on a holistic evaluation 
of  ‘family resemblances’ rather than a list of  necessary and sufficient conditions (Wittgenstein, 
1967). This process by which we draw correspondence between these prototypes and non-proto-
typical instances is metaphorical in nature (Lakoff  & Johnson, 1985). One common conceptual 
metaphor we all use on a routine basis is that of  ‘Well Being as Wealth’ to draw correspondence 
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between the moral concept of  ‘well-being’ and the economic concept of  ‘wealth’. 
While we understand and make use of  a great number of  concepts on a regular basis, we 
necessarily prioritise certain systems of  concepts to act upon in a given situation. Such systems 
of  concepts are defined as frames (Allan, 2001). The process by which we select frames (i.e. pri-
oritise one frame over another) and the metaphorical drawing of  correspondence to the proto-
type in our attempt to comprehend and respond to a specific situation is defined as moral rea-
soning (Johnson 1994). While in the majority of  situations we encounter, the selection of  frames 
and activation of  constituent metaphors is reflexive and unproblematic because the situation is 
close to the prototype, in situations that are non-prototypical we must determine a correspon-
dence with the prototype, and if  unsatisfactory, adjust an existing frame (Johnson, 1994). There-
fore, the way by which we judge right from wrong and proper from improper, emerges not from 
the explicit interpretation of  a set of  moral laws, but rather a cognitive process of  moral reason-
ing through frames and conceptual metaphors. While moral reasoning begins in individual cogni-
tion, its translation to action is also a collective social process (Hargrave, 2009) that is manifest as 
ideology. 
To begin to identify the frame choices of  different social groups, Lakoff  (2002) has argued 
that we should examine their processes of  moral reasoning by starting with the conceptual 
metaphor that those groups commonly use to frame their actions. Lakoff  illustrates this through 
an analysis of  the ideologies of  conservatives and liberals in American politics, by examining 
their moral reasoning over different social issues. Conservatives and liberals exist in both the 
Democratic and Republican parties, exemplifying that there are often ideological variations in the 
same party. Lakoff  uses the common conceptual metaphor of  the ‘nation as family’, with the 
government conceptualised as the parent and the citizens as children, to demonstrate the differ-
ences between the conservatives’ and the liberals’ processes of  moral reasoning and how those 
processes influence the framing of  particular issues (e.g. abortion).  
According to Lakoff  (2002), conservatives have an ideology based on a Strict Father mod-
el of  the nation as family. This model posits a traditional nuclear family, with the father (i.e. the 
state) having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the au-
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thority to set overall policy, to set strict rules for the behaviour of  children (i.e. the citizens) and 
to enforce rules. Children must respect and obey their father, because by doing so they build 
character. Self-discipline, self-reliance and respect for legitimate authority are crucial for the de-
velopment of  children and for their survival when they mature. Liberals however, have an ideol-
ogy based on the 'Nurturant Parent’ model of  the nation as family. Love, empathy and nurtu-
rance are primary because ‘children become responsible, self-disciplined, and self-reliant through 
being cared for and… caring for others’ (Lakoff, 2002: 108). The obedience of  children comes 
out of  their love and respect for their parents and community rather than fear of  punishment. 
‘The principal goal of  nurturance is for children to be fulfilled and happy in their lives’ (Lakoff, 
2002: 109). Raising a child to develop their potential for achievement and enjoyment, entails re-
specting the child’s own values by allowing them to explore the range of  ideas and options that 
the world offers.  
From this analysis, Lakoff  demonstrates how, both the conservatives and liberals draw on 
the common conceptual metaphor of  nation as family to reason that the system of  concepts (i.e. 
frame) around citizenship (childbearing) will be reproduced in the citizen (the child). The con-
cepts in each model are reflected in the other model, but with greater or lesser priority. For ex-
ample, moral strength appears in the Nurturant Parent model, but it functions not for its own 
sake but rather in the service of  nurturance. Also, nurturance appears in the Strict Father model 
but functions only as a consequence of  parental authority. Lakoff  (2002) defines three condi-
tions for differentiating between (opposing) ideologies, their distinct systems of  concepts, and 
how those are framed in communicative actions. 
First, each ideology should offer distinct explanations of  why certain beliefs on issues go 
together (e.g. gun control goes with social programs goes with pro-choice goes with environ-
mentalism). Lakoff  (2002) argues for the need to focus on conceptual metaphors as a way of  
identifying opposing ideologies, something which has already been proposed in organizational 
research (Heracleous, 2006; Oliver & Johnston, 2000). The key difference, as noted earlier, is that 
by focusing on common conceptual metaphors, research should examine how different systems 
of  concepts are mediated by the processes of  moral reasoning of  each group. Such research, we 
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argue, requires a historical analysis of  the socio-cultural context within which common concep-
tual metaphors are employed to frame various issues and actions. We come back to this point 
below. 
Second, each ideology should offer distinct explanations of  why the moral paradoxes of  
one social group (e.g. how can conservatives advocate right to life by being against abortion yet 
be in favour of  capital punishment?) are non-paradoxical for another social group (e.g. how can 
liberals favour the rights for children when they champion the rights for criminals such as con-
victed child molesters?) and vice versa. While previous organizational research has broadly de-
fined morality as ‘rules of  the game’ for what is considered appropriate in a given organizational 
setting (Alvesson & Wilmott, 2002), we propose looking beyond a fixed set of  laws or norms to 
more explicitly analyse the cognitive processes of  moral reasoning of  opposing ideologies.  
Lakoff ’s final condition is that each ideology should exhibit distinct choices in topics, 
words, and forms of  reasoning in framing (e.g. in conservative discourse ‘progressive taxation’ 
proposed by liberals is framed as ‘theft’). Thus, research examining the relationship between ide-
ology and morality should start with the communicative actions between different social groups. 
Previous organizational research has exemplified such an approach (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; 
Mueller et al., 2004; Samra-Fredericks, 2004). 
In considering the applicability of  these conditions in the study of  ecological crises, we 
found that some theoretical issues needed to be addressed. Specifically, Lakoff  (2010) explains 
that ideological divisions can be overcome through new mutually acceptable frames, for example 
achieving legislative compromise between liberals and conservatives by redefining the problem 
of  ‘global warming’ as ‘climate change’. This explanation, however, falls short in explaining the 
shift of  frames that is characteristic of  long-term historical cases. If  ideologies are relatively sta-
ble cognitive constructs that are widely shared by social groups, how do communicative actions, 
that are instantiations of  those ideologies, evolve over time or between different generations of  a 
social group at the same time? A further problem with attributing the difference between ideo-
logical deadlock and detente as the absence of  mutually acceptable frames is that it leads to a 
conflation of  ideology and the process of  moral reasoning. Such conflation leads to the portray-
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al of  individuals as ‘cultural dopes’ (Garfinkel, 1967) incapable of  reflexively negotiating actions 
necessary to cope with a crisis.  
The aforementioned issues suggest that further theoretical work is needed (Smith & Lewis, 
2011; Van De Ven, 1986) to resolve this apparent conflation between ideology, the process of  
moral reasoning and communicative action. In response to the first issue, we propose that histo-
ry should endeavour to be more than a chronological summary of  events, rather it should afford 
the ability to discover and document the shift of  frames over time (Lowenthal, 1985). In re-
sponse to the second, we propose that frames can be adjusted and re-prioritised over time and in 
relation to critical events through a renewed process of  moral reasoning. This helps to explain 
why, although ideology remains relatively stable, frames can shift as a consequence of  different 
concepts gaining higher priority in response to key historical developments.     
We therefore use Lakoff ’s conditions and our extensions to those as analytical starting 
points for our study of  the 19th Century French Phylloxera Crisis – an inquiry guided by the 
question: ‘What is the dynamic between ideology and moral reasoning, and how does that dynamic inform how 
stakeholders understand and respond to an environmental crisis?’ 
Methods 
The Phylloxera Epidemic destroyed two-thirds of  all European vineyards in the late 19th Centu-
ry. This ecological crisis, which spanned several decades, was marked by many critical events, 
documented through contemporaneous texts including periodicals and official reports, as well as 
recent histories, which we drew on to carry out our analysis. To achieve a balance between intu-
ition and early pattern recognition (Weick, 1989) and analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), we en-
gaged in a staged approach in order to improve the accuracy and generalisability of  our interpre-
tations. The stages of  our analysis follow the conditions for differentiating between (opposing) 
ideologies, their distinct systems of  concepts and the ways those are framed in communicative 
action as discussed in the previous section. 
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Historical Analysis of  Critical Events of  the Crisis & the Common Conceptual Metaphor Used 
by Different Stakeholder Groups 
Given that a grounded analysis of  all data was beyond the bounds of  what was rationally possi-
ble due to the complex nature of  the crisis (Pettigrew, 1990), we began with recent histories to 
provide a broad overview and focus for our search efforts. Recent histories can unearth new 
facts to improve the veracity of  our interpretations (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001) and provide 
greater contextual understanding (Golden, 1992) with which to judge the repercussions and ram-
ifications of  those choices. These recent histories emphasised perspectives that included: general 
history (Campbell, 2004; Garrier, 1984, 1989; Ordish, 1987); economic geography (Stevenson, 
1980); and scientific history (Gale, 2003, 2011; Sorenson, Smith, Smith, & Carton, 2008).  
From these sources, we synthesised a broadly inclusive meta-account of  how the crisis un-
folded through a series of  critical events. A ‘temporal bracketing strategy’ (Langley, 1999) was 
used to organise this meta-account into temporal periods to enable examination of  how the ac-
tions of  a previous period led to changes in context that influenced the actions of  subsequent 
periods (e.g. Barley, 1986). The crisis was identified as consisting of  five periods which are the: i) 
pre-crisis, ii) emergence of  crisis, iii) search for solutions, iv) implementation of  solutions, and v) 
aftermath of  crisis.  
This analysis revealed a pattern of  strong polarisation with relatively stable configurations 
of  constituent stakeholder sub-groups over time. We termed these two groups, the Theists and 
the Darwinists. The two groups can be distinguished in relation to their approach in interpreting 
what caused the crisis. On the one hand, the Theists adopted a ‘disease as effect’ theory, reason-
ing that if  the phylloxera was a parasite native to the Americas, American vines would have suc-
cumbed long ago (Pouget, 1990). Therefore, it was neglectful farmers who were culpable by em-
ploying expedient farming practices and making their vines susceptible to adverse weather condi-
tions and parasites such as the phylloxera (Gale, 2003). On the other hand, the Darwinists adopt-
ed a ‘disease as cause’ theory, reasoning that the host and parasite had co-evolved, resulting in 
gradual adaptations, which afforded American vines resistance to the Phylloxera.  
Theism represented the ideology of  the scientific and professional establishment led by 
the Academy of  France, the French Ministry of  Agriculture, the French Catholic Church, and 
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large commercial wine viticulturists, who were largely based in the National capital of  Paris. 
Darwinism represented the ideology of, what was initially, a small and disregarded scientific 
group influenced by the then recent theories of  Darwin, Lister, Pasteur, and others. This ideolo-
gy also came to be held by small family viticulturists, who were centred in Montpellier, the capital 
of  the Midi  wine growing region and the epicentre of  the epidemic. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate 1
a timeline of  the Phylloxera epidemic as it unfolded between these opposing ideologies through 
critical events that marked the struggle to make sense of, and then respond to the epidemic. 
———————————— 
Figures 1a and 1b about here 
————————————  
We then examined the evolution of  major French institutions such as the Catholic Church 
(Ford, 2005) and the body politic (Weber, 1979, 1991). Further accounts (Barthes, 1983; Echik-
son, 2005; Fourcade, 2012; Pitte, 2008; Simpson, 2011) granted us a more nuanced understand-
ing of  the economic, cultural and regional variation of  the wine industry, thus sensitising us to 
the ideological importance of  wine in French culture – both of  regional differences and com-
mon national values. Biographies and accounts of  several key scientific figures such as Pasteur 
(Latour, 1988) and Darwin (Desmond & Moore, 1992) enabled a better understanding of  the 
tentative nature of  new scientific discoveries (e.g. germ theory of  disease) and technological in-
novations of  the period (e.g. steamships, agricultural technologies, etc.) and then followed their 
development as paradigms over the period of  the crisis.  
By iterating between our contextual understanding and the conceptual metaphors that 
characterised the Theists and Darwinists, we concluded that the common metaphor used by 
both groups was ‘wine as a form of  identity construction’. The various debates between the two 
opposing ideologies could be seen as frames that were based on this common conceptual 
metaphor. The initial debates, which concerned the cause of  the epidemic (i.e. theories of  dis-
ease as ‘cause’ vs ‘effect’), became implicated in the ideologically-rooted conflict over the present 
plight of  post-Napoleonic France. The latter debates, concerning the response to the disease (i.e. 
 ‘Le Midi’ is term which literally means the position of  the midday sun - a colloquial Paris-centric term used to 1
describe the provincial departments of  southern France.
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approaches of  ‘adaptation’ through grafting vs maintaining ‘purity’ through eradication), were 
also a reflection of  the Theists’ angst over projections of  possible futures for French identity, 
and the Darwinists’ construction of  human identity in relation to other species in the natural 
environment. From this we determined the two respective variations on the common conceptual 
metaphor ‘wine as identity construction’ could be distinguished as ‘wine as progression’ and 
‘wine as tradition’ (see Table 1, upper section). 
Prioritizing Different Frames through Moral Reasoning 
Having now established the differences between these opposing ideologies, we returned to con-
temporary accounts of  critical events (e.g. editorial articles, news reports, official papers, etc.) to 
understand the process of  moral reasoning of  each stakeholder group. For example, in working 
iteratively between the main theories with which the Darwinists and Theists’ explained the prob-
lem, namely ‘disease as cause’ versus ‘disease as effect’, it was possible to inductively extend our 
understanding of  the processes of  moral reasoning within these two respective ideologies.  
The Theists’ initial view of  the insect as 'insignificant’ was possible if  understood within a 
broader struggle between ‘good' and ‘evil’, with one’s relative moral authority depending upon 
one’s relative position within a hierarchy of  nature under humans, and humans under god. By 
contrast, the Darwinist position could only be reconciled through an understanding of  the world 
as a complex ecosystem of  many diverse and competing species, whose continued survival with-
in that ecosystem was determined not by moral authority, but rather by their ‘fitness’ in adapting 
to the contingencies of  that environment. The Darwinists saw change as necessary for a species 
to adapt to a changing environment and therefore proposed a solution that would enable the 
vines to quickly adapt to the Phylloxera. The Theists however, saw the world through the per-
spective of  hierarchical structures earned through righteousness and moral rectitude, and thus a 
strong interest in maintaining those structures.   
In our analysis of  the frames used by members of  these opposing groups were notable 
for several key differences. For example, in describing the role of  viticulturists in the epidemic, 
the Theists reasoned towards frames premised on concepts of  moral intent (e.g. ‘good’, ‘evil’, 
‘laziness’, ‘neglect’) while the Darwinists employed frames characterised by concepts related to 
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emergence and unintended consequence (e.g. adaptation, modification, context). When the de-
bate turned to the role of  the insect, the Theists used frames to downplay its ability (e.g. ‘small-
ness’, ‘hidden life’) or gave it supernatural agency (e.g. ‘a plague’, ‘the evil’), while the Darwinists, 
particularly in their attempts to describe the insect itself, tended towards frames that granted it 
anthropomorphic characteristics (e.g. ‘good bourgeoisie’, ‘the Moor’) or in familiar terms (e.g. 
wolves and sheep, caterpillars and cabbages). 
From this insight, we further determined ‘wine as progression’ and ‘wine as tradition’ as 
premised upon underlying concepts of  structure, essence and agency. ‘Structure’ refers to the 
nature of  the known world, ‘essence’ to that which determines the relative positioning within the 
known world, and ‘agency’ to the imperative to maintain or improve that relative positioning (see 
Table 1, lower section). Table 1 represents the most salient aspects of  the key concepts of, as 
well as the crucial areas of  disagreement between, the Theists and the Darwinists. 
———————— 
Table 1 about here 
———————— 
Analysis 
In this final stage, we conducted an analysis of  key texts to determine how the concepts of  
structure, essence and agency of  the Theists and the Darwinists were prioritised over time. In 
particular, we sought to understand how the Theists eventually came around to seeing Phylloxera 
as the cause even though they disagreed initially, and how they finally acquiesce to grafting as the 
solution. Also, we sought to understand why the Darwinists initially proposed targeting the in-
sect but then seized grafting as the solution well before the Theists did. 
Here, we synthesised the overall frames of  each side with regards to attributing cause and 
prescribing response at the initial, intermediate and final phases of  the crisis, which we show in 
Table 2. What we found was that the Darwinists’ priorities changed little because they remained 
congruent with the evolving context. As for the Theists however, concepts of  structure were 
prioritised in the initial phases of  the epidemic, but as the crisis worsened and the ability to pur-
sue different courses of  action dwindled, concepts of  structure were backgrounded and con-
cepts of  agency prioritised. 
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———————— 
Table 2 about here 
———————— 
These findings allowed us to theorise how different concepts were re-prioritised and ac-
tions shifted over time, enabling opposing groups to overcome disagreements. The Theists, in-
fluenced by the French Catholic Church and their national pride, reasoned that adherence to the 
strict hierarchy of  moral authority, moral strength through self-discipline, and 'good' character, 
and the preservations of  moral boundaries was the only solution. The Darwinists however, rea-
soned that the crisis could be resolved by accepting that humans are but another species in the 
ecosystem, requiring that we and the vine must adapt to changing conditions. Through these un-
derlying processes of  moral reasoning, opposing groups prioritised frames with different systems 
of  concepts over time, allowing for the impasse to be resolved.  
For the purpose of  brevity, we mainly confine our account to the second and third of  
the five stages of  the crisis. Therefore, in the next section, we begin by describing the early stages 
of  the Phylloxera Epidemic, and then explain how hypotheses were developed, positions drawn, 
and responses proposed. We conclude with an abridged account of  how this crisis was eventually 
resolved – a solution upon which viticulturists still depend upon to the present day.  
The Phylloxera Epidemic 
The Crisis Begins and Two Opposing Ideologies Emerge 
In 1867, a mysterious malady caused the leaves of  vines to yellow and their roots to blacken and 
rot in the village of  Roquemaure, near Avignon, with the entire plant eventually succumbing over 
the next two or three seasons (Campbell, 2004; Gale, 2003). Over successive growing seasons, 
the progress of  this malady was likened to the ‘gradual spreading of  a spot of  oil’ (Planchon, 
1874: 553) that soon grew into the shape of  an ‘hourglass’ along the Rhône valley. Although the 
dead vines had roots which were blackened, rotted and knotted with tumours, no direct cause 
was visible (Garrier, 1989). The local chamber of  commerce responded by appointing a commis-
sion led by Jules-Émile Planchon, a Botany Professor at the University of  Montpellier, to inspect 
an affected vineyard. Upon accidentally digging up an apparently healthy vine, and discovering its 
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roots covered with clusters of  small yellow aphids, the commission quickly concluded that the 
insect was the cause of  the malady (Gale, 2011). 
From these same field reports, the Paris-based scientific establishment concluded differ-
ently. The insect was merely a symptom. This divergence in opinion was rooted in two long-
standing but competing theories of  disease, respectively named ‘disease as effect’ and ‘disease as 
cause’, which had implications for how empirical phenomena were understood. Planchon (1874: 
554) summarised the differences as follows: 
... the role of  Phylloxera in the new malady of  the vine may be reduced to two: the Phylloxera effect 
and the Phylloxera cause… According to the first theory, Phylloxera would be the result of  enfee-
blement… due, according to some theorists, to long-term monoculture, or wrong training of  the vine 
(too short, too long, too severe pruning). 
The ‘disease as effect’ theory viewed the body as a harmonious system with the states of  
health and disease as the result of  systemic balance or imbalance, and was the official doctrine 
for all biology-based disciplines including medicine, zoology, entomology and botany in 19th 
France (Gale, 2011; Pelling, 1993). The ‘disease as cause’ theory however, saw disease as the re-
sult of  a ‘contagion’ or ‘germs’ that infected the body (Cohen, 1961). It was around these two 
respective theories of  disease that, two ideologically opposed camps began to emerge, the The-
ists and the Darwinists. 
Small viticulturists were split over the cause of  the disease due to the slow and uneven 
spread of  the epidemic. Lowland vineyards generally succumbed before those at higher eleva-
tions. It was not uncommon for some areas to report complete devastation while adjacent areas 
recorded harvests (Stevenson, 1980). Yet unaffected viticulturists were often skeptical of  the 
Darwinists explanations, thus tending to side with the Theists (Ordish, 1987). A few claimed the 
Epidemic to be a divine punishment that afflicted the villages of  the less pious, with some viti-
culturists resorting to pagan rituals such as placing crosses of  hazel branches to ward off  evil 
(Campbell, 2004) or burying dead toads to draw poison from the vines (Robinson, 2006). For 
those affected, initially small viticulturists in the Midi, observations of  Phylloxera on the roots of  
dying vines and their absence on the roots of  adjacent healthy vines were proof  of  disease as 
cause. As the numbers of  affected viticulturists in each wine region reached majority however, 
explanations based on lax morality waned (Garrier, 1989) as they committed to the Darwinist 
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position. 
(Re-)Prioritizing Frames to Contain the Crisis 
The Theists were found to be influenced by the French Catholic Church and nationalist pride, as 
well as the official doctrine of  ‘disease as effect’, dominant in all biology-based disciplines in 19th 
France (Gale, 1979; Pelling, 1993). The Theists held a hierarchical view of  the position of  hu-
mans in relation to God and nature. The proposition that the Phylloxera could be the cause of  
the crisis, defied this belief. Félix Édouard Guérin-Méneville (quoted by de Ceris, 1873: 674), a 
prominent entomologist and a member of  the Academy of  Science argued: 
This parasite is not the cause, but a consequence... its smallness, its hidden life, and its insignificance 
as a zoological species undistinguished among the innumerable species of  the groups of  parasites 
within which it belonged. 
This concept of  structure justified the authority of  scientific, bureaucratic and religious 
institutions over that of  local practices and induction from empirical observation. Conversely, 
the Darwinists did not see hierarchical position as a factor in assigning responsibility or blame 
for the crisis. Instead they reversed the weight placed on these same values, and were therefore 
open to the possibility that the Phylloxera, despite its ‘smallness’ could be the cause. Gaston 
Bazille (1868: 522), a commercial viticulturist argued: 
It is possible that the original lice did choose in preference a sick vine; however, once established, they 
have become in and of  themselves, and independent of  all other facts – cold, drought, impoverished 
soil, excesses of  humidity – a cause, and unhappily a cause very actively withering and killing the 
remaining vines. The opinions of  our adversaries don’t explain at all the advancement of  the dis-
ease, or the present state of  the vineyards. 
Still, the Theists, reasoned that one’s moral strength is determined by his/her adherence to 
moral hierarchy; they argued that it was ‘lazy’ agricultural practices that left the vines susceptible 
to parasites such as the Phylloxera. The Editor of  the Journal de Villefraiche (quoted Garrier, 1984: 
123) reported that: 
It is believed that... the plague is a just punishment inflicted on the vignerons of  the southern 
Rhône... for their bloated production. 
This concept of  essence reinforced attitudes that those affected deserved punishment and 
were less worthy of  assistance, thus justifying the ultimately ineffective policy of  purification 
through the quarantine and elimination of  diseased vines. As with other human and agricultural 
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epidemics, the initial response was quarantine. Local officials ordered that affected vineyards be 
identified, dug up and torched. Small viticulturists attempted to salvage some value by selling 
their dead vines as firewood, which helped the Phylloxera to spread by allowing it to drop from 
the dead vines onto yet unaffected vineyards (Stevenson, 1980). Some found that the prolonged 
flooding of  a vineyard could drown the Phylloxera, an approach that required the use of  large 
steam-driven pumps, teams of  workers to build dykes around the vineyard, and was only suitable 
for vineyards on flat ground (Ordish, 1987). In addition, sulphur-based pesticides were highly 
flammable and only effective in certain soils (Campbell, 2004) and often toxic to adjacent fruit 
and vegetable crops (Simpson, 2011). Both immersion and pesticides were prohibitively costly 
for all but the wealthiest viticulturists, such as the owners of  well-known properties in the Bor-
deaux and Burgundy (ibid), and was not a permanent cure as they required repeated annual 
treatment (Gale, 2011).  
In contrast, the Darwinists reasoned that the ecosystem is dynamic and subject to constant 
change. Rather than attempting to control the Phylloxera through quarantine and eradication, 
they sought to understand the insect’s lifecycle in order to develop a solution. Planchon (quoted 
in Cazalis, 1869: 238) advocated: 
It is useless to look elsewhere for the cause, unhappily too evident, of  the malady and the deaths.... 
What is now necessary to find is no longer to find the cause of  the malady, it is its remedy.  
Research by Riley eventually confirmed that the Phylloxera could live above and below 
ground, adapting to local conditions (Sorenson et al., 2008). In Europe, the Phylloxera seemed to 
live almost entirely below ground – leading to speculation that it multiplied through asexual re-
production (Campbell, 2004). The idea that Phylloxera could reproduce without a male counter-
part was attacked by the Theists and especially the French Catholic Church (Ordish, 1987). De-
spite the failure of  early attempts, the Theists continued to advocate eradication through pesti-
cide treatment. Just as previous infestations were controlled through pesticides, the Imperial 
Minister of  Agriculture, Clément Duvernois, pleaded for ‘men of  science’ to find a solution and 
offered a reward of  20,000 Francs “to be awarded to the one who finds an effective and practical 
means of  defeating the new disease known as the Phylloxera” (Duvernois, 1870, quoted in 
Campbell, 2004: 112). 
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The Darwinists reasoned along the concept of  adaptation (i.e. species must adapt to 
changing conditions to survive). They eventually argued that the only practical way forward was 
to adapt the vine through approaches such as grafting the American Vitis on the rootstock of  
the European Vitis Vinifera. Planchon (1874, p.566) proposed: 
Given the age-old existence of  Phylloxera in the United States and the rapid death of  European 
vines, it is clear that American vines possess the power to resist their secular enemy... they are gener-
ally sturdier than their civilised descendants. It is possible that a process of  natural selection bit by 
bit eliminated those wild vines that could not fight the enemy insect in varying degree...  
Meanwhile, the Theists conversely reasoned that eradication was the only solution, based 
on the concept of  preservation. They viewed the American Vitis as ‘impure’, which would create 
‘‘centaurs’’ and ‘‘chimeras’’ (Mudge, Janick, Scofield, & Goldschmidt, 2009) that would ‘‘taint 
pure French vines’’. The Country Life correspondent for Le Temps (de Cherville, 1878: 4) exhort-
ed: 
The fight must continue [with insecticide] and any recourse to America forsworn until, should it 
come, the very day of  defeat... and we cannot entirely despair that... will not one day result in a 
practical and economic remedy that will save our French vines entire from the tip of  their stems to 
the base of  their roots... 
This sentiment was shared by large commercial viticulturists, particularly those with presti-
gious properties in the Bordeaux and Burgundy, who sought to preserve the pedigree of  their 
vines. In 1879, the Ministry of  Agriculture exclusively sanctioned pesticide treatment, and pro-
hibited imports of  American Vitis, except to areas already completely destroyed by the Phyllox-
era. In areas dominated by small viticulturists such as the Burgundy, this led to conflict between 
local officials tasked with enforcing regulations and desperate family viticulturists who illicitly 
planted American Vitis rootstock to reconstitute their devastated vineyards (Gale, 2011).  
Despite the vast commitment of  resource, the Theists’ policy of  eradication failed to slow 
the advance of  Phylloxera across France. The Superior Commission of  the 1881 Phylloxera 
Congress in Bordeaux conducted a review of  all available scientific papers, white papers and 
other field reports and concluded that apart from the experiments with grafted rootstock and 
hybrid vines, no other solution proved effective or economically viable (Phylloxera., 1883). Fur-
thermore, wine tastings were demonstrating that wine from the fruit of  grafted Vitis vinifera was 
indistinguishable from that of  the ‘pure’ Vitis vinifera (Campbell, 2004). For reasons of  taste and 
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authenticity however, the option of  reconstitution through hybrid vitis-American vines found 
relatively little official support and was quickly ruled out (Ordish, 1987). 
The Aftermath  
Nearly a decade of  intensive research was still required to develop new hybrid species of  root-
stock, that were tolerant of  a broader range of  soil and climate conditions, to enable the full re-
constitution of  all French viticultural regions (Paul, 1997). In 1887, the Ministry of  Agriculture 
finally reversed the policy of  eradication and began to subsidise the reconstitution of  vineyards 
through American vitis rootstock grafts (Campbell, 2004). Although grafting practices were ini-
tially developed by small viticulturists in Burgundy, the large-scale commercial viticulturists, par-
ticularly those of  the Bordeaux, finally committed to reconstitution by the 1890s (Simpson, 
2011). The reconstitution effort precipitated a massive shift from traditional mixed crop farming. 
Growers unable or unwilling to reconstitute, abandoned viticulture for the intensive cultivation 
of  fruits and vegetable crops, livestock and horticulture. Consolidation among remaining viticul-
turists drove the transformation of  winemaking into one dominated by large-scale commercial 
viticulturists (Margadant, 1979). 
Discussion 
In our analysis of  the Phylloxera Epidemic we examined the dynamic between ideology 
and moral reasoning, and how this dynamic informs how stakeholders understand and respond 
to an ecological crisis. Using the common conceptual metaphor of  ‘wine as a form of  identity 
construction’, our analysis revealed that, there were two distinct ideologies influencing the fram-
ing of, and response to, the crisis, namely, the Theists and Darwinists. We discussed the respec-
tive processes of  moral reasoning of  each of  these ideologies, and showed that while drawing on 
the same conceptual metaphor, the two stakeholder groups prioritised different concepts to justi-
fy and legitimate actions relative to the Phylloxera Epidemic as the crisis unfolded.  
The key contribution of  this paper is to extend our current conceptualisations of  how dif-
ferent groups frame a crisis based on their ideology, by emphasising the role of  moral reasoning 
in this process. As we have seen in our analysis of  the Phylloxera Epidemic, the Theists were ini-
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tially found to ideologically resist acknowledging the agency of  the Phylloxera. However, as time 
went by and the crisis unfolded to the point of  completely destroying all vineyards and in exten-
sion a large part of  the French economy, the Theists adjusted their frame regarding who and 
what possessed agency. The phylloxera was now reframed as possessing the capability to destroy 
one of  France’s main industries. It is only at the point where other approaches to eradicate the 
Phylloxera failed, that the Theists acknowledged the viability of  reconstitution through the graft-
ing of  French vines on American rootstock. In this sense, they did not renounce their ideology, 
but rather, they re-positioned themselves against the crisis and the actions that needed to be tak-
en by extending their frames to accept a previously unacceptable position. Indeed, the Theists 
were able to maintain their underlying ideology, while at the same time pragmatically changing 
their actions towards the crisis.  
The Theists came to agree with the Darwinists on the solution to the crisis, not out of  a 
master frame that reconciled both perspectives. Rather, key critical events in the crisis forced 
them to adjust their moral reasoning to reconcile their ideology with actions needed to sufficient-
ly respond to the crisis. Initially, the Theists were found to reason that they needed to preserve 
the entire French vine (Vitis vinifera) from ‘the tips to the roots’ in order to save wine. As the 
crisis unfolded, the Theists eventually came to accept that the goodness of  a vine should be 
evaluated by that part of  the vine that is above the earth, with the rootstock now only a neutral 
conduit between the vine and its terroir. Furthermore, as the process of  reconstitution entered 
the latter stages, the ability to choose between different courses of  action increased as the crisis 
eased, which enabled a return to concepts of  structure. Hierarchy would become the fore-
grounded concept and preservation was backgrounded as hybrids were outlawed and new classi-
fications of  regions and permissible species of  vine and wine-making techniques were imposed 
through the AOC (Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée or controlled name of  origin) system. 
While intransigence is often dismissed as negative, we found that it played a generative role 
as it forced both sides to experiment with and develop their theories of  causality and potential 
solutions. The Theists continued to develop their experiments to eradicate the insect through 
flooding, sand planting and pesticides. In particular, the pesticide approach evolved significantly 
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in terms of  different formulations and application technologies. At the same time, the Darwin-
ists used this period to identify and breed different rootstocks for grafting that were suitable for 
the varied climate and soil conditions across the viticultural regions of  France. Scientists on both 
sides continued to develop, test and reject various hypotheses regarding the Phylloxera until an 
adequate understanding of  its life cycle was achieved. Indeed, despite the emergence of  grafting 
techniques among small Burgundy viniculturists in the 1870s, nearly a decade would be required 
to marshal the breadth and depth of  national resources and capabilities before large-scale im-
plementation of  the reconstitution effort could begin. It was the time and space afforded by this 
intransigence that enabled a failing course of  action to be abandoned in favour of  a more sus-
tainable trajectory out of  crisis.  
We now turn to the implications of  these theoretical insights for organizational research in 
ecological crises. 
Implications 
Our research has implications for understanding debates around different crises by empha-
sising the process of  moral reasoning in the instantiation of  a group’s ideology. Although John-
son’s (1994) and Lakoff ’s (2002) work has already been applied in a variety of  social and political 
studies to understand how different groups prioritise various concepts through their respective 
ideologies to frame political action (Edgell, 2012; Massengill, 2008; McAdams et al., 2008), the 
role of  morality has been largely overlooked in organizational studies.  
In particular, some research recognises the importance of  morality for understanding or-
ganizational action, but without explicitly linking it to ideologies (Feldman & Feldman, 2006; 
Whittle & Mueller, 2012). In cases, where such an explicit link is provided, the focus is not on 
how moral reasoning mediates debates over a crisis, but rather on how morality can question 
conventional approaches to understanding power and dominance in organizational settings (Kir-
by & Harter, 2003; Marston, 2000). Further, some organizational research has examined the role 
of  arguments for morality in rhetorical strategies of  legitimation, whereby actors invoke emotive 
moral claims to appeal to human concerns (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Vaara & Tienari, 2008), and 
to express emotion or ‘move an audience’ (Samra-Fredericks, 2004). While this research offers 
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insight into how moral claims can move communicative action, it has not offered deeper insight 
into the underlying process of  moral reasoning.  
Our research contributes to organizational studies by examining the dynamic between ide-
ology and moral reasoning, and it informs how stakeholders understand and respond to an eco-
logical crisis. As Johnson observed, ‘Many of  the most pressing moral debates, however, concern 
whether we should extend the scope of  morality beyond our anthropocentric world to embrace 
other forms of  life and even the ecosystem as a whole’ (1994: 254). Our findings build upon 
these ideas about the link between moral reasoning and ecological sustainability by showing how 
ideologies tend to become more apparent when a crisis creates an imperative to choose between 
different courses of  action. Crises often lead to the reawakening of  inconsequential or dormant 
ideological divides, because actors must inevitably employ conceptual metaphors in their framing 
to take positions on these issues. Thereby, in extending Lakoff ’s (2002) work, we argued that, in 
times of  crises, key critical events (Kieser, 1994) push actors to shift their frames while engaging 
in processes of  moral reasoning. This has helped us to explain why, although ideology remains 
relatively stable, frames can shift as actors reason how to respond to a crisis.  
Our study, therefore, responds to previous calls for the integration of  history into organi-
zational studies (Clark & Rowlinson, 2004; Kieser, 1994; Suddaby, Foster, & Mills, 2014; Wad-
hwani & Bucheli, 2014). As Clark and Rowlinson (2004) argue, most longitudinal research hinges 
on ahistorical assumptions about the universalism of  human and organizational behaviour and a 
timeless present. In this study, we have moved the analysis beyond the boundaries of  organiza-
tional studies’ disciplinary orientations to consider the deeper theoretical and methodological 
issues that a call for historical research raises (Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014). We exemplify the use 
of  both recent histories and contemporaneous texts in the analysis of  conceptual metaphors and 
framing across opposing stakeholder groups during a crisis. 
Furthermore, we contribute to research on organizations and the natural environment 
(ONE) (Jermier & Forbes, 2011b; Kallio & Nordberg, 2006) by providing rich insights into his-
torical studies of  ecological crises. ONE scholars have repeatedly called for a less anthropocen-
tric and more ecologically focused discourse with which to understand the relationship between 
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organizations and the natural environment (Hoffman, 1999; Jermier, Forbes, Benn, & Orsato, 
2006; Shrivastava, 1994; Stead & Stead, 2009) and to consider how moral claims influence the 
actions of  opposing stakeholder groups on the natural environment (Phillips & Reichart, 2000; 
Waddock, 2011). We respond by offering a fresh perspective on the effects of  framing on sus-
tainable development by placing emphasis on the process of  moral reasoning, explaining how 
different frames get re-prioritised by opposing stakeholder groups at different points in time. 
This is one of  the first studies to explicitly offer an analysis of  the moral reasoning of  di-
verse stakeholder groups during a crisis, and how such reasoning contributes to frame shifting 
over key historical events. As we explore in our analysis of  the Phylloxera Epidemic, it was the 
persuasive arguments of  the Darwinists and the persistence of  the phylloxera in resisting eradi-
cation efforts that eventually led to the Theists’ re-prioritisation of  key frames and their accep-
tance that the vines and the insect had to coexist. Our theoretical and methodological focus on 
key historical events and the conceptual metaphors used by different stakeholders to make sense 
and respond to the crisis has enabled a deeper analysis of  the process of  moral reasoning that 
influences the trajectory of  a crisis. In particular, our theoretical and methodological focus has 
enabled a deeper understanding of  how different stakeholders remain consistent with their ide-
ology, yet able to flexibly shift their actions towards the crisis.  
These theoretical contributions can be applied to the analyses of  more recent crises such 
as HIV and the Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks (Leach et al., 2010). We can also approach the 
broader debate over whether human activity has detrimentally affected the climate through an 
analysis of  the key frames being prioritised by opposing ideologies. The climate change debate is 
often centred on opposing frames. These include, the potential for losses in terms of  economic 
competitiveness and the attendant affects upon employment and economic prosperity; flooded 
coastal cities and societal collapse; and equity in terms of  the shared burden for sustainability 
measures between developing and developed economies (Heggelund, 2007; Leiserowitz, 2005). 
This has led to inevitable disputes over priorities for action (e.g. economic growth versus cutting 
carbon emissions) and thus intransigence and failure to achieve necessary consensus for attempts 
to implement broad multilateral agreements on reducing emissions of  greenhouse gases such as 
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the Kyoto Protocol of  1997 (Nordhaus & Boyer, 1999). Within the context of  such frames, local 
anecdotes that contradict assertions of  global warming receive as much attention as comprehen-
sive peer-reviewed analyses (Hulme, 2009). 
As with the case of  the Phylloxera Epidemic, this state of  intransigence also offers the 
time and space for experimenting, developing and implementing prerequisite new technologies, 
policy mechanisms and business models. Furthermore, existing courses of  action such as main-
taining the status quo need to be cast into doubt and thus begin to lose their legitimacy. For ex-
ample, media coverage of  the inundation of  New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina has had a role in 
reversing doubts over the veracity of  climate change in American society (Boykoff, 2007; Gid-
dens, 2009). Lakoff  (2010) argues that the ongoing effort to reframe the issue of  ‘global warm-
ing’ as ‘climate change’ has been a key factor in gaining bipartisan support for legislative moves 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions among American Liberals and Conservatives (Kerry & Gra-
ham, 2009). New frames can be constructed through moral reasoning so as to accommodate 
those groups, who simply perceive weather and climate patterns as deviating from historical 
norms (i.e. whether hotter, colder or simply more extreme), and reconcile with those who view 
the climate getting progressively warmer. Such new frames can help create a ‘bigger tent’ that 
accommodates greater diversity in worldviews and makes collective action more likely. 
Therefore, it is by understanding how the ideologies of  opposing stakeholder groups are 
instantiated that a common ground can be found upon which solutions to a crisis can be enact-
ed. Ultimately, any frame that enables us to regard our natural environment as merely a resources 
or means to an end is inferior to one that recognises the complexity interactions between organ-
isms that comprise that ecosystem. As we have shown with the example of  the Phylloxera Epi-
demic, crises can be mitigated and the worst consequences averted by eventual consensus 
through an adaptation of  frames to reconcile deeply rooted ideological differences, which, as in 
the case of  climate change, can threaten to lock us into unsustainable trajectories of  develop-
ment.  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Figure 1a – Timeline of  Crisis: Making sense of  the epidemic 
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Figure 1b – Timeline of  Crisis: Responding to the epidemic 
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Table 1 – Key ideological differences 
Darwinists Theists
Primary 
stake- 
holders
Initially a small group of  scientists 
influenced by recent theories of  
Darwin, Lister, Pasteur, etc.; and 
small viticulturists centred in the 
Midi.
The Paris-based scientific establish-
ment led by the Academy of  France; 
the Ministry of  Agriculture; the 
Catholic Church; and large viticultur-
ists.
Common 
conceptual 
metaphor
Wine as a form of  identity construction
Variations 
of  the 
common 
conceptual 
metaphor
Wine as progression 
Like culture and nationhood, wine 
emerges from complexity and thus 
must remain open to change and 
renewal.
Wine as tradition 
Wine is a manifestation of  the purity 
and tradition of  culture and nation-
hood and thus must remain resolutely 
French.
Concepts 
of  
structure
Structure as eco-system 
Humans (and the vine) are a species 
within a broader ecology. Interac-
tions are manifold, complex and 
emergent, with each species occupy-
ing unique positions within a het-
erogeneous ecosystem.
Structure as hierarchy 
The world is a cosmic hierarchy (e.g. 
man under god, woman under man, 
man above nature, centre above pe-
riphery, French vines over others, etc.) 
whose moral rectitude determines 
one’s authority and standing.
Concepts 
of  essence
Essence as adaptation 
The ecosystem is dynamic and sub-
ject to constant change, with the 
imperative of  survival determined 
by the extent of  adaptation by a 
species to local selective environ-
mental pressures. Adaptation is 
strength and maladaptation is weak-
ness.
Essence as rectitude 
The world is divided into good and 
evil with entities having an essential 
character that determines their con-
duct. Good/evil is equated with 
moral strength/weakness. Strength is 
gained through self-discipline and re-
straint (i.e. being ‘upright’) while 
weakness comes from self-indulgence 
and laziness (i.e. ‘falling’ down’ and 
thus vulnerable to evil.
Concepts 
of  agency
Agency as change 
Survival depends on the ability to 
change to suit environmental con-
tingencies. If  the environment is 
beyond our control or comprehen-
sion, then we must address the 
problem by changing new practices 
for dysfunctional ones.
Agency as preservation 
Goodness is the preservation of  the 
order and integrity of  predetermined 
structures, while evil is the chaos and 
decay. Evil is fought through purifica-
tion and exclusion to maintain these 
boundaries. If  boundaries are not 
maintained, evil like disease, can 
spread.
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Table 2 – Re-prioritising key frames in the crisis 
Darwinists Theists
Initial frame
The interaction of  species is com-
plex, therefore the cause may be best 
determined through empirical ob-
servation of  local phenomena and 
inductive reasoning. The insect is the 
cause, therefore we must directly 
target the insect.
A mere insect cannot be the cause 
of  the blight. Provincial scientists 
cannot know better than the scien-
tists of  the capital. Lazy practices by 
the morally weak have ‘enfeebled’ 
the vines, making them susceptible 
to parasites and adverse climate.
Intermediate 
frame
The insect must be understood on 
equal terms (i.e. an anthropomor-
phic perpective). The nature and 
dynamic of  the Phylloxera lifecycle 
can be better understood through 
the study of  local context and inter-
actions.
The insect is an evil over which man, 
if  worthy, should eventually prevail 
(i.e. an anthropocentric perspective). 
It must be excluded (e.g. quarantines, 
import bans) and purged by all pos-
sible measures (e.g. flooding, fire, 
pesticides).
Final frame
Complete eradication of  a well-
adapted species such as the Phyllox-
era is neither practical nor possible. 
Growing practices and the vines 
themselves must be adapted to sur-
vive. French vines will be preserved 
through the adoption of  American 
rootstock.
The insect is an evil that is kept at 
bay through the use of  rootstocks to 
preserve the French vine. Hybrid 
vines and and fake wines however 
must be eliminated and the purity of  
traditional practices must be 
restored.
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